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This paper studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and scal policy stabilization
in a New Keynesian model, where the scal policymaker uses a distortionary tax as the policy
instrument and operates with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of
the instrument. We demonstrate that longer scal cycles result in stronger complementarities
between the optimal actions of the monetary and scal policymakers. When the scal cycle is
not very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a su¢ ciently
long 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scal policymaker in its actions may help to avoide these adverse e¤ects.
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Fiscal and monetary policies face di¤erent institutional restrictions and operate at di¤erent fre-
quencies. Monetary policy maker sets interest rate every month, and the decision process can
arguably be described as (constrained) optimization with the clear aim to stabilize the short run
uctuations.1 In contrast, scal decisions are often taken annually, and the policy of contem-
porary scal authorities can rarely be described as aiming to stabilize the economy in the short
run. This situation is likely to change, however, if scal policy is given a more active short run
stabilization role: not only the scal policy becomes more focussed on stabilization, but also the
decision process becomes more regular. This paper contributes to the discussion on the institu-
tional design of stabilizing scal policy, which operates at lower frequency than monetary policy
does, uses distortionary taxes as a policy instrument, and acts without implementation lags.
This institutional design has important implications for the dynamics of the economy. With
longer scal cycle the optimal scal adjustments are bigger; they impact more on monetary policy
maker and escalate the conict between the two authorities in case the scal policymaker uses
distortionary taxes. Indeed, optimal actions of the monetary and the scal policy makers are
dynamic complements in the sense of Cooper and John (1988): higher tax rate, set by the scal
policy maker in response to a higher debt level, generates the cost-push ination, which increases
the marginal return to a monetary policy decision to raise the interest rate and contribute to
the debt accumulation. In standard quarterly models this reinforcement mechanism is weak; we
demonstrate that it is greatly amplied if discretionary scal policy operates only infrequently.
We show that the gain from monetary and scal policy stabilization of macroeconomic uc-
tuations can be greatly overestimated, if it is evaluated using models with frequent scal policy
stabilization. We can fail to account for arising expectations traps (King and Wolman, 2004)
with implications of excessive volatility of welfare-relevant economic variables; we can also fail to
realize the necessity to constrain the scal policymaker, as time-consistent policy may not exist.
We study interactions of monetary and scal policies in the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) class
of innite horizon non-singular discrete-time linear dynamic models that is typically used to study
aggregate uctuations in macroeconomics. We use the standard New Keynesian model with mo-
nopolistic competition and sticky prices to demonstrate the results. The economy is controlled by
monetary and scal policy makers which act non-cooperatively at di¤erent frequencies. The mon-
etary policy maker optimizes every period while the scal policy maker optimizes less frequently,
choosing the distortionary tax rate once every several periods. After the tax rate is chosen, it
stays at this level until the next scal optimization. The scal policy maker has an intra-period
leadership: the monetary policy maker observes scal policy at every period, and the scal policy
maker knows that the monetary policy maker optimizes every period and takes into account his
reaction function when formulating policy.
More specically, we demonstrate the existence of expectations traps in the case of longer scal
cycles; although we also nd that these traps are unlikely to present a problem for a policymaking.
Following Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) we investigate stability properties of these equilibria and
nd that the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is selected in all cases we study. More importantly, we
demonstrate that welfare-preferred discretionary equilibria may not exist, once the scal cycle
1There is an extensive literature on the subject, see e.g. King (1997), Svensson (2010).
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is su¢ ciently long  one year in our model  and the reinforcement mechanism between the
optimal actions of the two policymakers is particularly strong. We argue that scal policymaker,
who optimizes only infrequently and optimally chooses to make large corrections, needs to be
made constrained in its actions. We uses a number of policy scenarios to illustrate our ndings,
they include stabilizing debt faster than socially optimal, and infrequent scal optimization of a
constrained scal policymaker.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we present a model of monetary and
scal policy interactions. Section 3 presents the general framework with infrequent stabilization.
Section 5 discusses policy implications in three special cases: quarterly, biannual and annual scal
stabilization. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model, discussed in Woodford (2003), modied to
take account of the e¤ects of scal policy.2 It is a closed economy model with two policymakers,
the scal and monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is assumed to support monetary policy in
stabilization of the economy around the non-stochastic steady state.
The economy consists of a representative innitely-lived household, a representative rm that
produces the nal good, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing rms and a monetary and
scal authority. The intermediate goods-producing rms act under monopolistic competition and
produce according to a production function that depends only on labor. Goods are combined
via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce aggregate output. Firms set their prices
subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. Households choose their consumption and leisure and can
transfer income through time through their holdings of government bonds. We assume that the
scal authority faces a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are nanced
by levying income taxes3 and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
We assume that all public debt consists of riskless one-period bonds. The nominal value Bt
of end-of-period public debt then evolves according to the following law of motion:
Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1 + PtGt    tPtYt; (1)
where  t is the share of national product Yt that is collected by the government in period t, and
government purchases Gt are treated as exogenously given and time-invariant. Pt is aggregate
price level and it is interest rate on bonds. The national income identity yields
Yt = Ct +Gt; (2)
where Ct is private consumption. For analytical convenience we introduceBt = (1+it 1)Bt 1=Pt 1
which is a measure of the real value of debt observed at the beginning of period t, so that (1)
becomes





   tYt +Gt

: (3)
2See e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2003).
3We could use distortionary consumption taxes to nance the decit. The transmission mechanism would be
the same.
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gt   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 t + yt)

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and letters without time
subscript denote steady state values of corresponding variables in zero ination steady state. The
private sectors discount factor  = 1=(1 + i). We have assumed B = 0 in order to make the
presentation of the model particularly simple. This assumption results in no rst-order e¤ects of
the interest rate and ination on debt, so that the nal version of the linearized debt accumulation




(bt + (1  ) (1  ) gt   ct    t) ; (4)
where we used the linearized (2) to substitute out output and denoted  = C=Y .4
The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve that describes Calvo-type price-setting deci-
sions of monopolistically competitive rms is standard (Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Sec. A.5)
and marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. A log-linearization of the aggregate supply
relationship around the zero-ination steady state yields the following New Keynesian Phillips
curve
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( +) is the slope of Phillips curve. Parameter  is Calvo parameter,
parameter  is Frisch elasticity of labour supply,  is elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods: Cost push shock t
follows an autoregressive process.





















J (t; ct;  t; gt; bt) ; J 2 fM;Fg: Each policy maker knows the laws of motion (4)-
(5) of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when formulating policy. The following
assumption follows Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and substantially simplies the exposition
of the model.
4Because we work with one-period debt only, its proportion in the total stock of debt is not very large. We
discuss implications of this assumption for policy in Section 3.
5The criterion is derived under the assumption of steady state labour subsidy. Here parameter  is a function of
model parameters,  = =; and  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of monopolistically produced
goods.
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Assumption 1 (policy instruments) The monetary policymaker chooses consumption ct and
then, conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of ct and t; decides on the value of interest
rate that achieves the desired ct and t. The scal policy maker uses the tax rate  t as policy
instrument and keeps government spending constant gt = 0.
Apart from making the exposition clear, keeping scal spending constant allows us to focus
on the particular transmission mechanism of monetary and scal policy.
Despite the simplicity of the model, nding time-consistent optimal policy is not trivial. Of
course, the economy can be completely insulated against shocks if the two policy instruments
are adjusted to o¤set the e¤ect of shocks on ination and debt. However, such policy would be
time-inconsistent as it would need to o¤set the e¤ect of expectations Ett+1 on current ination.
In what follows we assume that both policy makers and the private sector know that the decision
making is sequential and a di¤erent policymaker may be in the o¢ ce in future periods. We refer
to this policy as policy under discretion. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (policy) Monetary and scal policy mix satises the following assumptions.
(i) Monetary and scal authorities act non-cooperatively.
(ii) Both authorities are assumed to optimize sequentially under time-consistency constraint.
(iii) The monetary policy maker optimizes every period, but the scal policy maker optimizes
once every N periods, N  1.
(iv) The scal authority has intra-period leadership.
The assumption of scal intra-period leadership is motivated by the observation that the
monetary policy reaction function is much more transparent and predictable, so the scal policy
maker is able to take it into account when formulating policy.6 Using the interest rate as an
instrument implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are made simultaneously, while
in this model they are consecutive decisions taken by relevant agents. This makes no di¤erence
for our results.
The assumption of time-consistency prevents the complete and instantaneous stabilization of
the economy. Moreover, the relatively large adjustments of infrequent scal policy may create
more di¢ culties for monetary policy to o¤set the e¤ect of disturbances on the economy. Smooth
stabilization may not be possible any more.
The infrequency of scal decisions can be interpreted as scal commitment to the policy of
xed tax rates in all periods between the optimization. Such policymaking, however, remains
sequential, without the ability to manipulate the expectations of the private sector beyond the
periods between scal reoptimizations.
Assumption 3 (policy objectives) Both policy makers are benevolent.
Di¤erent objectives of the two policy makers are likely to result in a conict between the
policy makers as one policy maker tries to undothe perceived harm done by the other.7 We
6Simultaneous moves of the two policy makers could be another possibility. Empirical evidence (Fragetta
and Kirsanova, 2010) suggests that in countries without scal decentralization, like the UK, the regime of scal
leadership is the most relevant.
7See e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Lambertini (2006).
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shall demonstrate that a similar conict exists even if both policy makers are benevolent but
operate at di¤erent frequencies. The assumption of di¤erent frequencies also makes the leadership
structure important. If both policy makers are benevolent and face identical constraints, then
the intra-period leadership does not play any role. In our case the policymakers face di¤erent
constraints, so the leadership does matter. In this paper we have chosen to study scal leadership
as arguably most empirically relevant.
Finally, we make the assumption which is crucial for clear exposition without the loss of
generality.
Assumption 4 The model is perfect-foresight deterministic.
If the stochastic model is linear-quadratic (LQ) then the stochastic component of the solution
can be obtained in the unique way once the deterministic component is known.8 We are inter-
ested in issues of existence and uniqueness of the time-consistent policy and these properties are
una¤ected by the introduction of stochastic components in the LQ framework.
To summarize, the law of motion of the deterministic economy can be written as:




(bt   ct    t) ; (8)







;  =  (1 ) : Debt bt
is the only endogenous predetermined state variable. The objectives of each policy maker coincide
and are given by formula (6).
3 Discretionary Equilibrium
In this Section we dene discretionary equilibrium in which the monetary policy maker reoptimizes
every period while the scal policy maker decides once every N periods, N  1: We refer to
the period between scal reoptimizations as the scal cycle. We denote the set of numbers p
congruent to a modulo N as [p]N . There are exactly N di¤erent sets [p]N :We shall identify these
sets with the corresponding residue: [p]N = p; so p denotes the time period after the latest scal
reoptimization. Both the monetary and scal policy makers optimize in period 0 = [0]N . Only
the monetary policy maker optimizes in periods [1]N ,..,[N 1]N , which are labelled p = 1; ::; N 1.
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
Suppose the monetary and scal policy maker both optimize at period t. Because of the LQ
nature of the problem we guess and verify later that the private sectors reaction function is a
linear function of the state:
t+p = 
p
bbt+p; p = 0; ::; N   1: (9)









   p+1b 

 t+p (10)























Figure 1: Timing of events
The private sector observes policy and the state, and takes into account the instantaneous
inuence of the policy choice, measured by





   p+1b 

.
The monetary policy makers problem in period p = 0; ::; N   1 can be described by the
following Bellman equation, where the value function depends on the number of periods passed
since the last scal optimization. Assuming the quadratic form for the appropriate value function



















(bt+p   ct+p    t+p)
2!
;
where we substituted constraints (8) and (10) written for the appropriate period:




































and p = 1; ::; N   1: The monetary policy maker observes scal policy, and takes into account its
instantaneousinuence, measured by cp .
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The scal policy maker only optimizes in periods [0]N . Suppose the optimization happens at
time t. The Bellman equation which describes the scal policy decision can be written as:











where constraints (8), (10), and (12) are applied in any period p = 0; ::; N   1; because the state
in period [N ]N  [0]N depends on scal policy in all intermediate periods,  t+p; p = 0; ::; N   1:
We assume that the scal policy maker, when chooses  t also sets  t+p p = 1; ::; N   1 such
that
 t+p =  t: (16)
This policy has the following representation
 t+p = 
p
bbt+p; p = 1; ::; N   1: (17)
Indeed, take (17) one period forward and use (16) to obtain
 t+p+1 = 
p+1













1  cpb    (1 + cp ) pb
; p = 0; ::; N   2: (18)











{   p+1b 

cp +    p+1b

 t+p
= pbbt+p + 
p
 t+p = ::: = 
p;0
b bt + 
p;0












bt+p    (cp + 1)  t

= ::: = Bp;0b bt + Bp;0  t (21)
where the coe¢ cients with superscript 0 are obtained by the recursive substitution  t+k; k = 1::p;
and p = 0; ::; N   1:
Substitute these constraints into the Bellman equation (15) and di¤erentiate with respect to
 t to yield:
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which determines the time-consistent reaction of the private sector in (10).




























































It follows that V = S0 = SN : in periods when both benevolent policy makers reoptimize their
value functions are the same.
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 2-4 the stationary discretionary equilibrium with intra-period
scal leadership can be described by the set of coe¢ cients V [ fpb ; cpb ; cp ; pb ; SpgN 1p=0 :
Proof. For a given b0 = b; each trajectory fbt; t; ct;  tg1t=0 which solves the system of rst
order conditions (8), (10), (12), and (17) we can uniquely map into the set of coe¢ cients V [
fpb ; cpb ; cp ; pb ; SpgN 1p=0 , satisfying (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26). Conversely, if the set of
coe¢ cients V [ fpb ; cpb ; cp ; pb ; SpgN 1p=0 solves (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26) we can uniquely
map it into the trajectory fbt; t; ct;  tg1t=0; solving system (8), (10), (12) for given b0 = b:
4 Calibration
The model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Table 1 reports the baseline
calibration of parameters. Calibration of ;  and  is relatively straightforward, they correspond
to the most frequently estimated values of the steady state annual interest rate of 4%, the average
frequency of price changes of one year, and consumption to output share of 75%. Estimation and





Discount factor  0.99 
Calvo parameter  0.75 
Consumption to output ratio  0.75 
Intertemporal elasticity  0.3 [0.1, 1.3]
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  3.0 [0.3,4]
Elasticity of substitution between goods  11.0 [4,11]
Estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply  vary widely, depending on whether macro-
or micro-evidence is used. Peterman (2012) reports values of  2 [2:9; 3:1] from the empirical
work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages. This range is consistent
with values used by macroeconomists to calibrate general equilibrium models but greater than
the estimates of  2 [0:3; 0:8] which are obtained in microeconomic studies even if decisions on
labour participation are taken into account, see Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The
main source of this di¤erence lies in the heterogeneity of the workforces reservation wages. When
a larger proportion of the workforces reservation wage is about the market wage, a small change
in the market wage leads to a large change in the labour force participation, see Chang and
Kim (2005) and Gourio and Noual (2009). However the density of marginal workers can only be
observed at the macro-level; the e¤ect is larger in countries with higher involuntary unemployment
which leads to higher aggregate elasticity of labour supply. This e¤ect is not identied at the
micro-level where a small change in the market rate often does not lead to a noticeable change in
the participation status of an individual. So we consider values between 0.3 and 4 plausible for
 .
Similarly, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity  vary depending on the wealth of the
representative households and the proportion of nondurable goods in their consumption bundle,
see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The empirical evidence for  is
quite far-ranging from near 0.1 reported in e.g. Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), to
above 1 reported in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) nd
that the estimate of  increases from 0.3 for the aggregate data to 0.8 for cohort data, suggesting
that the aggregation, which is implicit in the macro data, may cause a signicant downward shift
in the estimate of .
The elasticity of substitution between goods, ; determines the monopolistic mark up. Chari
et al. (2000) argue for a markup of 11% for the macroeconomy as a whole. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) obtain elasticity of substitution 7.88, corresponding to a markup of 14.5%.
Di¤erent industries have di¤erent markups, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001)
report mark ups of 27-45% for automobiles and branded cereals industries.
We use base line values of parameters as reported in the rst column in Table 1, but we
also investigate the robustness of our results to the range of alternative calibrations given in the
second column in Table 1.
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5 Policy Interactions
In this section we study how an increase in the length of the scal cycle a¤ects the economy under
discretionary policy. Dynamic complementarities play a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of
the economy once the scal cycle becomes longer.
We start with the known case of frequent monetary and scal policy stabilization.9 We use
this example to discuss the transmission mechanisms of monetary and scal policy interactions.
We continue with the case of biannual scal optimization, which enables us to demonstrate
how the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of consequent monetary policy
makers within the scal cycle results in multiple discretionary equilibria and potential expectation
traps. We also demonstrate that the agents are likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium.
These two cases help us to investigate the more complex case of annual scal optimization,
which is arguably the most empirically relevant case. We demonstrate how the dynamic comple-
mentarity between the optimal actions of monetary and scal policymakers leads to expectation
traps. Although we demonstrate that in this case the coordination problem is likely to be resolved
as well, as all agents are more likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium, we also show that
the existence of these equilibria is very sensitive to the parameterization of the model and to
the length of scal cycle. We argue that actions of the scal policymaker should be restricted
to some extent, as this ensures the existence of good equilibrium outcome for a wide range of
parameterization of the model and policy scenarios, as well as for longer scal cycle.
5.1 Quarterly Fiscal Stabilization
In the standard case of frequent stabilization both policy makers operate at the same quarterly
frequency. The model is simple enough to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If 0 <  < 1;  > 0;  > 0 then a stationary discretionary equilibrium exists and
unique.
Proof. The system of rst order conditions (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26) can be written
as follows (where we omit the index p):
cb =  
({   b)b    V
({   b)2 + + 22 V
(27)
c =  
({   b) (   b) + 2 V
({   b)2 + + 22 V
(28)
 b =  (({   b) c +    b) (b + ({   b) cb) + c cb




 (1 + c ) (1  cb)V
(({   b) c +    b)2 + c2 + 2 (1 + c )2 V
9See Blake and Kirsanova (2011) for a general form solution to this class of problems.
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b = (b + ({   b) cb + (({   b) c + (   b))  b) (30)




V (1  cb    (1 + c )  b)2 (31)
Introduce new variable, Cb = cb + c b. Using several substitutions we transform the system
of rst order conditions (27)-(31) into the system of two equations in fCb;  b + Cbg:
Cb (Cb;  b + Cb) = Cb +
 ({   )
 ( b + Cb) + ({   )2
( b + Cb) = 0 (32)
 b (Cb;  b + Cb) = ( b + Cb)
2     ({   )
2





Equation (33) only depends on z =  b + Cb and always has exactly one positive solution as the
free term is negative.
The unique positive root satises 1 j1   (Cb +  b)j < 1; (or equivalently 1  <  b + Cb <
1+
 ) so that the equilibrium is stationary. To see this, note that if z+ is the positive root, then
z  =  












0: (i) We show that  b+Cb > (1  ) = . Indeed, suppose ~z+ = (1  ) = : ~z+ is not the positive
root to (33); if it was the positive root then the negative root would be ~z  =   ({   )2 = () and
their sum should have been equal to the negative linear coe¢ cient; but ~z++~z  <

  ({   )2

= () :
Moreover, any ~z+ < (1  ) = is not a root of (33), because @ (z+ + z ) =@z+ > 0: (ii) We show
that  b + Cb < (1 + ) = . Indeed, suppose ~z+ = (1 + ) = : ~z+ is not the positive root to (33);
if it was the positive root then the negative root would be ~z  =   (1  ) ({   )2 = ( (1 + ))
and their sum ~z+ + ~z  >

  ({   )2

= () : Moreover, any ~z+ > (1 + ) = is not a root of
(33), because @ (z+ + z ) =@z+ > 0:
Panel I in Figure 2 presents constraints (32)-(33) in fCb;  b + Cbg space. Solution to equation
(33) is plotted with the dashed line, and solution to equation (32) is plotted with solid line. The
unique equilibrium is labelled A in Panel I in Figure 2 and its characteristics are given in Table
2.
Equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning discussed in Section ??, and we report
this in Table 2.
It is easy to see that because equilibrium A is stationary, i.e. 1 j1   ( b + Cb)j < 1; then
equation (??) implies that the x-point of TPS is locally stable under the PS-learning.
IE-stability under the JF-learning plays an important role in the analysis of cases with longer
scal cycle. Using the fact that all equilibria are IE-stable under the L-learning, and replicating
the steps of the revision process of all agents who are learning, helps us to discover RE equilibria in
this and more complex cases with longer scal cycle. We illustrate this process in Panel II of Figure
2. Suppose the scal policy maker considers implementing policy  b; which is not necessarily
optimal. In response to this policy the followers learn their optimal response fCb; S; bg. Their
learning problem is equivalent to the joint learning in the single-policymaker setting, which is
discussed in details in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) and Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). If  b = 0
then the scal policymaker does not respond to debt and there is unique set fCb; S; bgP which
describes the case in which the monetary policymaker and the private sector coordinate on the
reaction so that in response to higher debt the monetary policymaker generates high demand and
11
























Panel I: Analytical Solution





























































Figure 2: Unique Equilibrium in Frequent Fiscal Optimization Model
Table 2: Characteristics of Equilibria
Eq. A Eq. B
Frequent Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy [ b] [0:8671] 
Monetary Policy [Cb] [ 0:0657] 
Private Sector [b] [0:0048] 
Normalized Loss L 1.0000 





















[4:7; 5:0] 10 3 [23:8; 0:7] 10 3
Normalized Loss L 0.9956 18.8413

































[4:6; 5:2; 5:7; 6:0] 10 3   [0:8; 1:0; 1:4; 2:3] 10 2
Normalized Loss L 1.0256 2.0068
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] [Y,Y,N]
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accommodates high ination so that debt is quickly steered back to its equilibrium level. The
corresponding positive CPb is plotted in the left chart in Panel II. If  b > 0 and su¢ ciently large
then the process of debt stabilization is tightly controlled by scal policy and in response to higher
debt the monetary policymaker and the private sector coordinate on the response fCb; S; bgA in
which the demand is lowered and ination is not accommodated. The corresponding positive CAb
is plotted in the left chart in Panel II.10 If  b is moderate, both types of responses of the monetary
policymaker and the private sector exist, as shown in the left chart in Panel II. In response to each
fCb; S; bgj ; j 2 fA;Pg the scal policymaker can learn its optimal response jb ; j 2 fA;Pg.
For each set fCb; S; bg the response b is unique if it exists, see Section ??. Therefore, for an
initial guess  b we nd the update in the revision process of the scal policymaker b ( b) :We plot
b = 

b ( b) for a range of initial guesses and for each equilibrium reaction fCb; S; bgj ; j 2 fA;Pg
in the right chart in Panel II in Figure 2 with the solid line. By construction, all points of
intersection of this line with the 45o line are the points of discretionary equilibria which are
IE-stable under the JF-learning by construction.
The result of Proposition 2 on the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not obvious if the model
has dynamic complementarities between action of the economic agents (Cooper and John, 1988).
Optimal actions of the monetary authority and of the aggregated private sector can be dynamic
complements. Suppose the reaction of scal policy is given and xed at b : For a given reaction
of the private sector b in t = bbt the monetary policy nds the optimal response by solving
the corresponding Bellman equation, taking into account its intra-period leadership. If b is
su¢ ciently high (low) then in response to higher-than-steady-state debt the monetary policymaker
optimally raises demand. Greater tax base leads to higher tax collection and reduces the level
of debt towards the steady state. Ination starts moving back to the steady state. We plot this
U-shaped optimal recation function Cb = Cb (b) in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3
with the solid line. In its turn, the optimal reaction of the private sector b = b (Cb) is increasing
in Cb: If the debt is higher than its steady state level and the monetary policymaker generates
higher demand, the total e¤ect of the higher demand on marginal costs is always positive, as the
tax rate is xed to b : We plot the positively sloped reaction function b = b (Cb) in the left
hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3 with the dashed line. Both lines are positively sloped in
the area with relatively large b, and this can result in multiplicity of partial equilibria, i.e. in
multiplicity of optimal responses of the monetary authorities and the private sector. Indeed, if
we reduce (e.g. halve) the scal feedback  b then there are three points of intersection of optimal
reactions of monetary authorities and the private sector, see the right hand side chart. The case
in the left hand side chart in Panel I corresponds to multiple discretionary equilibria discussed in
Blake and Kirsanova (2012) where the scal feedback on debt of non-strategic scal policy was
relatively small to guarantee multiplicity of equilibria.
Optimal actions of scal policy and the private sector can be dynamic complements too.
Fixing the monetary policy reaction to the optimal level Cb < 0 produces reactions of the scal
authority  b =  b (b) and of the private sector b = b ( b) plotted in Panel II in Figure 3. The
reaction of the private sector is positively sloped as higher tax rate set by the scal authority in
response to higher debt  b always results in higher prices set by rms. The reaction curve if the
10There is close resemblance between these two partial equilibria and active and passive monetary policy
described in Leeper (1991).
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Figure 3: Dynamic complementarities between agentsactions
scal policymaker is also positively sloped but only for moderately positive response of ination
to debt, b: To understand this suppose the debt is higher than its steady state level. Because
Cb < 0 the demand is automatically reduced and so are marginal costs. Lower demand also
contributes to faster debt accumulation. If the response of ination to debt is only moderately
positive, then the optimal response of taxes to debt rises with stronger response of ination. This
will keep debt under control, and will not compromise ination stabilization. As a result, the
reaction curves of the private sector and the scal policymaker are both positively sloped, but
only in a relatively narrow area of responses of the private sector. For our baseline calibration,
and given Cb ; there are three jointly optimal discretionary responses of scal policymaker and
the private sector. However, only one of them results in discretionary equilibrium in the model,
as the other two partial equilibria require di¤erent optimal policy response once the monetary
policy becomes strategic.
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Finally, and most importantly for our study, optimal actions of the monetary and the scal
policymakers can also be dynamic complements. Higher tax rate, set by the scal policy maker
in response to a high debt level,  b , generates greater cost-push ination, which increases the
marginal return to a monetary policy decision to reduce demand and contribute to the debt
accumulation. The monetary policy reaction function Cb = Cb ( b) is negatively sloped, see Panel
III in Figure 3. Conversely, a reduction in response of demand to debt, Cb; makes it optimal
to raise taxes in order to prevent too fast accumulation of debt. As a result, the scal policy
reaction function  b =  b (Cb) is also negatively sloped in wide area, see Panel III in Figure 3.
The presence of dynamic complementarities is a necessary condition for the multiplicity of
discretionary equilibria, see King and Wolman (2004) and Blake and Kirsanova (2012). However
this condition is not su¢ cient and, as we argue next, the interaction of the two mechanisms in
the model with frequent scal optimization results in the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
First, the complementarity between optimal decisions of the private sector and of the monetary
policy maker may result in multiplicity only if scal policy optimally responds to debt only weakly,
see Panel I, the right hand chart. The optimal scal response b even to the weak initial guess
 b is strong enough to rule out the equilibrium with passive monetary policy.
Second, although the optimal decision of the scal policy maker is increasing in the optimal
decision of the monetary policy maker, this dynamic complementarity between optimal decisions
of the two policy makers in case of frequent scal optimization is not strong enough to create the
multiplicity.
The following two cases demonstrate how the longer scal cycle increases the strength of
dynamic complementarities in the model and how this shapes the optimal outcome of monetary
and scal policy interactions.
5.2 Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Suppose that both policy makers optimize in even periods, and we index all such periods with
index 0. Only the monetary policy maker optimizes in odd periods, we index such periods with
index 1. To save on notation we use the period index p 2 f0; 1g and use  p to indicate odd
periods if p = 0; and even periods if p = 1.
Despite we cannot prove analytically the existence and multiplicity of equilibria, we can nd
all discretionary equilibria numerically.
Proposition 3 For the base line calibration of the model two discretionary equilibria exist.
15
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After multiple substitutions the system of rst order conditions (34)-(40) can be reduced to












= 0; although at the
expense of much complexity. We plot solutions to these equations in Panel I in Figure 4. The
curves intersect in two points with V = S0 > 0; S1 > 0; and
B0bB1b  < 1:We label these points of
intersection as equilibria A and B.
Multiplicity of discretionary equilibria implies that following a disturbance, for example a
higher initial debt level, the economy can follow one of multiple paths, each of which satises
conditions of optimality and time-consistency. Each of these paths is associated with di¤erent
monetary and scal policies; see Figure 5 which plots two di¤erent adjustment paths following
the same initial increase in the debt level. For comparison, the Figure also includes responses in
case of frequent scal stabilization.
Suppose the level of debt is above the steady state and scal policy raises the tax rate for
two periods. Following the high marginal cost ination will rise and stay above the steady
state for these two periods. The monetary policy maker will nd it optimal to intervene. The
monetary policy maker at time 0 takes into account monetary policy in period 1. There is a
dynamic complementarity between the actions of the two consequent monetary policy makers
within the scal cycle: the deeper is the future cut in demand, the bigger payo¤ the current
monetary policy maker gets from engineering high demand today. A high demand today results
in optimal reduction of demand in the future, within the same scal cycle. Two point-in-time
equilibria arise. In the rst such equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policy maker will keep the
current demand low and the period-1 monetary policy maker does not generate a big cut in
demand. In the second equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policy maker stimulates high demand
in anticipation that the period-1 monetary policy maker will implement a cut in demand. The
scal policy maker when choosing policy in period 0, perceives the both possibilities. The optimal
16





















































Figure 4: Discretionary Equilibria in the Biannual Fiscal Stabilization Model
scal response in the rst point-in-time equilibrium response is to raise the tax rate less than in
the second equilibrium. The strong response of the tax rate in the second equilibrium generates
a zig-zagpattern of adjustment: with low two-period-average demand, the increase in the tax
rate generates substantial fall in the stock of debt so that the second half year cycle mirrorsthe
rst half year one, but with the opposite sign. Figure 5 also demonstrates that in equilibrium A
the paths of all variables approximatethe optimal paths of the corresponding variables under
frequent optimization, and we shall call equilibrium A approximating. We call equilibrium B
zig-zag.
Despite the clearly increased ination volatility, the loss in the approximating equilibrium is
slightly lower than it is in the unique equilibrium under frequent optimization, see Appendix ??.
This is mainly due to faster stabilization of the economy in this equilibrium. The two-period
tax rate increase predominantly determines the two-period speed of debt adjustment
B0bB1b A =
0:64 < 0:96 = jBbj2 : This welfare gain of faster stabilization is slightly higher than the welfare loss
of higher volatility. The loss in the zig-zagequilibrium is much higher than in the approximating
equilibrium. Not only it generates the relatively slow speed of adjustment, as
B0bB1b B = 0:79 >B0bB1b A ; but it also induces very high volatility of economic valuables.
Finally, equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning we consider in this paper.
Equilibrium B is not IE-stable under both JF-and J-learning. Panel II in Figure 4 illustrates
this.
To summarize, the main conclusion from the example of biannual scal stabilization is the
demonstration of the existence of the approximating equilibrium. Although the other equilibrium
exists, the approximating equilibrium delivers the best possible outcome under the infrequent
17
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frequent Eq. A frequent Eq. B
Figure 5: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes every other
period.
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discretionary scal stabilization, and is also the only equilibrium which is IE-stable under all
types of learning we study in this paper. In this equilibrium the monetary policy maker can o¤set
most adverse e¤ects of scal infrequency on welfare-related macroeconomic variables. In the next
example we argue that we should not take this result for granted once the scal cycle becomes
longer.
5.3 Annual Fiscal Stabilization
5.3.1 Multiplicity of Discretionary Policy Equilibria
Building on results in the previous section we present the third example of infrequent scal
stabilization. Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant setup in which the monetary policy
maker reoptimizes every quarter, but the scal policy maker reoptimizes only at the beginning of
every four quarters.
In this model we are unable to present the system of rst order conditions as a system of two
polynomial equations and use the graphical method of nding solutions. We have to resort to
numerical methods and the stability properties to nd discretionary equilibria of interest.
Proposition 4 If the monetary policymaker takes decisions quarterly and the scal policymaker
optimizes annually then for the base line calibration of the model there are two discretionary
equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning.
Proof. The proof relies on the use of numerical methods. As discussed in Section 5.1 we search for
equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning by replicating the steps of the revision process
of all agents who are learning. For every, not necessarily optimal 0b we nd all lim
k!1
TkJF (x) = x






















the 45o line in two points, labelled A and B. By construction, these points are the points of
discretionary equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning. With further increase in 0b
no further equilibria were discovered.12
The dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of the two policy makers is re-
sponsible for the multiplicity of equilibria. An optimal response of monetary policy reinforces the
action of scal policy: higher levels of taxation have a cost-push e¤ect and so the optimal mone-
tary response is to reduce demand and the tax base. Smaller tax base requires a higher tax rate to
ensure the desired speed of debt stabilization. Both policy makers can coordinate on either slow
or fast correction of the level of debt towards the target. Figure 7 illustrates these interactions.
Consider equilibrium A. Suppose the initial debt is higher than in the steady state and the tax
rate is kept high for four periods. This implies a steep reduction in debt. The e¤ect of future high
tax rates and high marginal cost creates expectations of high future ination. If monetary policy
does not o¤set the e¤ect of scal infrequencythen debt and consumption adjust in a linear way
11The limit is computed numerically with tolerance jxk+1   xkj < 10 13.
12 In the area of discontinuity in Panel I the time-consistent representation of the xed tax rate policy requires
innitely large feedback on debt in the last quarter 3b . No discretionary equilibria exist there.
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Figure 6: Discretionary Equilibria
between the periods of scal optimization. The e¤ect of lower consumption is smaller than the
e¤ect of higher tax rate and ination stays above the frequent optimization solution benchmark.
The tax rate remains high for the four periods and, by the end of the fourth period, it is much
higher than it would be if optimization happened every period. The tax correction in the fth
period brings ination down. Figure 7 demonstrates that the ability of the optimal monetary pol-
icy to reduce ination volatility is limited. Indeed, it is clear from the picture that consumption
should go down rst and then up in the rst four periods if the ination humps in rst two periods
to be eliminated. Such stabilization results in sub-optimally high volatility of consumption. In
what follows we call equilibrium A slow approximating. This equilibrium is IE-stable under all




= 0Ab ; j 2 fPS; JF; Jg
Under discretionary equilibriumB the tax rate is initially kept above the frequent-optimization
benchmark. This generates a much steeper reduction of the level of debt than is observed in the
slow approximating equilibrium A. The higher tax rate results in a higher level of ination and
lower consumption. We call equilibrium B fast approximating. This equilibrium is not IE-
stable under the J-learning but is stable under the private sector learning and the JF-learning.
The IE-stability under the JF-learning allowed us to locate it, see Figure 6.
To summarize, in case of the annual scal cycle there are at least two discretionary policy
equilibria. Only two equilibria are IE-stable under the JF-learning. Their existence is a result of
the strong dynamic complementarity between optimal actions under the two policies, monetary
and scal, given that scal policy uses distortionary taxes as the policy instrument. However,
their existence is likely to be non-robust to the model specication; this is suggested by Panel I




; which may not
intersect the 45o line at all. In the next section we discuss why this may occur.
5.3.2 Existence of Approximating Policy Equilibrium
We argue that the existence of the approximating equilibrium is not robust to changes in model
calibration and to policy scenarios. To communicate the argument we present several examples.
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Panel I: Solution A
































Panel II: Solution B




















quarterly fiscal sabi lization annual fiscal stabil ization
Figure 7: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes once a year.
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Fast Stabilization of Debt Consider a policy scenario in which the scal policy maker is
assigned an additional target to stabilize debt faster than socially optimal, such as the new Euro-
pean Fiscal Treaty. Suppose the monetary policy maker is benevolent, but the scal authoritys















If the scal policy maker is benevolent, as studied above, then b = 0.
The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends on the calibration of . Both approx-
imating equilibria do not exist if b > 0 and is su¢ ciently high.
13 In order to understand this
result, consider the familiar scenario of high initial debt. Suppose that both policy makers are
benevolent and we are in the slow approximating equilibrium A; see the left panel in Figure 7. If
we impose a debt target for scal policy, i.e. start increasing b  0, the scal policy maker will
try to speed up the debt stabilization with an increase in the tax rate relative to the benchmark
case of b = 0. The cost-push e¤ect will increase ination more and so the monetary policy maker
will choose to engineer a bigger fall in consumption. This, of course, will slow down the speed of
debt stabilization and require an even higher tax rate. The process converges: each additional
reduction in demand requires a smaller increase in the tax rate. Equilibrium exists, and in this
equilibrium the debt is reduced faster than is plotted in the left panel in Figure 7.
This contrasts with the e¤ect of introducing the debt target in equilibrium B. Suppose debt
is higher than in the steady state by one unit, policy makers are benevolent and we are in the fast
approximating equilibrium B; see the right panel in Figure 7. Note that in this equilibrium debt is
stabilized with an observed overshooting after the rst year. If we impose a debt target, i.e. start
increasing b  0, then raising the tax rate in the rst several periods becomes counterproductive.
If the tax rate is raised higher than in the b = 0 case, this results in even bigger overshooting of
debt, which works towards destabilizing the debt. In order to ensure faster debt convergence the
tax rate has to rise less and monetary policy has to engineer a smaller fall in consumption. The
scal policy maker anticipates that demand will not respond much and will lower the tax rate.
This process converges: each additional reduction in the size of demand cut requires a smaller
reduction in the size of the tax rate increase.
To summarize, with the increasing weight on the debt target equilibria A and B move towards
each other so that the dynamics of the economy in equilibria A and B become similar. The
dynamic of the economy in response to the higher debt level in the limiting case A = B is plotted
in Figure 8. For comparison we also plot the result of frequent stabilization without the debt
target.
If the debt target becomes even stronger, then no approximating equilibrium exists. Any
proposed increase of the tax rate 0b results in a strong optimal IE-stable under the JF-learning
response of the other agents within the scal cycle. To counteract the perceived response requires






> 0b . We can summarize this outcome in the form of the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 For the base line calibration of the model and with su¢ ciently high weight on the
debt target of scal authorities the approximating discretionary equilibrium does not exist.
13For the benchmark calibration of model parameters this threshold value of  = 0:0003:
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no debt target, quarterly debt target, quarterly debt target, annual
Figure 8: The Limiting Case of the Unique Approximating Equilibrium in the Annual Fiscal
Optimization Model
Proof. The proof is numerical. Our iterative approach nds two equilibria under the base line
calibration with b = 0. With an increase in parameter b the two equilibria eventually coincide






does not intersect the 45o degree line.
This result does not imply that there is no discretionary equilibrium if equilibria A and B
do not exist. Yet another equilibrium might exist. In particular, Panel II in Figure 6 and its
similarity with Panel II in Figure 4 suggests that zig-zagequilibrium might exist.14 Strategic
complementarity between the actions of subsequent monetary policy makers may lead to a zig-zag
adjustment of demand within the scal cycle. These adjustments might be ne tunedsuch that
the annual average magnitude of them is not large enough to provoke the destabilizing increase in
the tax rate. However, such equilibrium is not IE-stable under the JF- and J-learning. Moreover,
it is di¢ cult to call such equilibrium approximating.
The existing algorithms for nding solutions are not suited to obtaining all possible equilibria
in a complex case with many states. We could only do this for the quarterly and the biannual
models. However, Figure 6 makes it clear that the approximating equilibrium will disappear if the
14We cannot use the continuityargument as the reaction function of an agent is described by a rational function,
not by a polynomial function.
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debt target is su¢ ciently strong, rather than we suddenly became unable to locate it numerically.
We can be reasonably sure that if an additional equilibrium exists in the annual optimization
model, this equilibrium will not be IE-stable under the JF- and J-learning, it will also generate
a very low level of social welfare because of the high volatility in macroeconomic variables.
Calibration of the Model The existence of the approximating equilibrium is also sensitive
to the calibration of the model. Calibrations of the model which result in stronger reactions of
monetary and scal policies are likely to lead to non-existence of the approximating equilibrium.
Both approximating equilibria do not exist if the Frisch elasticity labour supply  is reduced
to 2.3, or if the baseline value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution  is only slightly
increased to 0:35; or if the elasticity of substitution between goods  is reduced to 5.7 which
corresponds to an increase of the mark up to 21%.
All these threshold values of parameters are completely plausible and are within the range of
estimates which are often obtained in empirical studies of aggregated data, as we argue in Section
4.
High Level of Debt The main case discussed in Section 2 assumes zero level of the steady
state debt. This assumption reects the relatively small proportion of the short-term debt in a
typical developed economy, and allows us to present many results in an analytical way. However,
high and persistent level of debt is not uncommon.
We can rewrite our model in the more general form, using interest rate as the monetary
policy instrument, and retaining the possibility to study implications of higher level of steady
state debt. We can demonstrate that the size of the steady state level of debt a¤ects the strength
of the dynamic complementarity. The e¤ect of the nominal interest rate and ination on the
process of debt accumulation rises linearly with the steady state level of debt. In response to
high ination the optimal monetary policy will raise interest rate; both the high (real) interest
rate and the consequently low tax base increase the rate of debt accumulation, and this e¤ect is
stronger with higher steady state level of debt.
The numerical analysis of this scenario produces diagrams that are remarkably similar to the
case of the debt target. If the steady state debt to output ratio reaches approximately 0.25 which
corresponds to short-term debt to annual output ratio of 0.07 then discretionary equilibria A
and B coincide. With higher debt to output ratio the approximating equilibrium does not exist.
Frequency of Fiscal Optimization The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends
on the frequency of scal optimization. The longer the period between the reoptimizations the
longer the tax rate remains xed, and the stronger action of monetary policy is required in order
to o¤set the adverse e¤ect on ination when the tax is adjusted. The approximating discretionary
equilibrium may not exist.
Constraining the Fiscal Policymaker In order to preserve the approximating equilibrium
the strength of the complementarity should be reduced. One way to achieve this is to constrain
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If  is not too large then this policy results in the unique IE-stable under the JF-learning
equilibrium. However, if  is su¢ ciently large then the complementarity between the monetary
policymaker and the private sectors actions leads to multiplicity, very similar to the result in
Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). Panel III in Figure 6 demonstrates the outcome when  = 0:1:
There are two stationary equilibria, both of which are IE-stable under all types of learning which
we consider. If scal policy does not react to debt su¢ ciently strongly  in this case because
it is constrained then the agents can either coordinate on equilibrium A in which the private
sector does not expect the monetary policymaker reacts to debt but stabilized ination and the
monetary policymaker validates these expectations, or they can coordinate on equilibrium B in
which the private sector expects the monetary policymaker accommodates inationary shocks
but ensures fast stabilization of domestic debt and the monetary policymaker validates these
expectations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the implications of infrequent discretionary scal optimization for the
stabilization of the economy, assuming dynamic interactions of monetary and scal policymakers
where both policymakers are benevolent and the scal policymaker uses distortionary taxes to
stabilize the economy. We demonstrate the presence of dynamic complementarity between the
optimal monetary and scal policies. A higher tax rate, which is required to stabilize higher
debt, will have a cost-push e¤ect. The optimal monetary policy response to this will generate a
reduction in demand and in the tax base, and faster debt accumulation. Anticipating this, the
scal authorities will wish to raise tax rates further.
If both policies operate with the same frequency, this reinforcement mechanism is weak and
does not lead to signicant adverse e¤ects. However, with longer scal cycle, the e¤ect of this
mechanism is greatly amplied. If the length of scal cycle is not too long then expectation
traps arise. With more periods between scal reoptimizations and with stronger reinforcement
mechanism an (IE-stable) discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
We demonstrate the latter outcome for many practical scenarios. We argue, therefore, that
the scal policymaker who reoptimizes only infrequently should be constrained. As one of possible
ways to constrain the policymaker we demonstrate that a moderate penalty on variability of the
scal instrument can be useful in reducing the degree of dynamic complementarity between the
actions of the two policymakers.
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